



Why do some states elect two Senators from different parties? 
Don’t blame it on strategic voters.
Among America’s elected branches, the United States Senate has the unique feature of having
two members represent each state.  Because the same set of voters choose each Senator, we
might expect that the overwhelming majority of states would elect two Senators from the same
party.  Yet split-party Senate delegations—same-state Senate duos made up of one Democrat
and one Republican—have been quite common throughout history.  Why?  Some scholars argue
that split delegations occur because voters want to “balance” their state’s overall Senate
representation.  Chris Donnelly finds little support for such a theory, and suggests that those
seeking to explain divided Senate delegations ought to move beyond the notion that voters are
strategically choosing such an arrangement. 
Why might a state elect two senators from different parties?  In his 1992 book, Dvided Government, political
scientist Morris Fiorina suggests that split-party Senate delegations might arise from “balancing,” whereby voters
seek to bring the average ideological preferences of their state’s two senators closer to the middle of the political
spectrum and, as a result, might choose the U.S. Senate contender to whom they are less ideologically proximate.
As Fiorina writes:
From the voter’s standpoint, Senate elections can produce three possible outcomes: two
Democrats, two Republicans, or one of each.  But the voter can never express a preference
among all three outcomes because in any given election, one senator is not running.  Thus, the
voters have a choice only between two senators of the same party as the senator who is not
running, or of one senator from each party.  …In an ordinary spatial model of a two-candidate
election, the voters simply vote for the candidate closer to them.  …But in a Senate election, the
voters may very well care about the total representation of their state in the Senate.  …If voters
care about the total representation of their state, they may very well vote for candidates who are
farther from them than their opponents.  (81-82) (emphasis added)
Figure 1 below provides an illustrative example of this logic.  In this hypothetical Senate election, we have a
Democratic Senate candidate, shown by xD, who is located at -2 on the [-3, 3] left-right interval, with -3 being far-
left and 3 being far-right.  We also have a Republican Senate candidate, shown by xR, who is located at 2 on the
same left-right interval.  If voters simply choose the candidate closest to them, then the dividing line—or, more
technically, the “cutpoint”—is located at 0; everybody to the left of 0 will vote for the Democrat and everybody to the
right of 0 will vote for the Republican.
Figure 1
If, on the other hand, voters want to choose the state’s overall Senate delegation to which they are closer, the way
that Fiorina suggests, then they must consider the ideological location of the state’s Senator who is not up for re-
election (only 1/3rd of the Senate is reelected at a time).  That Senator’s location is shown by x S, which, as we
see, is on the far left at -3 (given the ideological makeup of the United States’ two parties, we can safely assume
that this Senator is a Democrat).  So as result, a Senate delegation made up of the Democratic Senate candidate
at -2 and the Democratic Senator who is not up for re-election at -3 is going to be located at -2.5, because this is
the average of -2 and -3.  At the same time, a delegation that consists of the Republican candidate at 2 and the
Democratic Senator who is not up for re-election at -3 will be located at -0.5, because this is the average of 2 and
-3.  So now, because voters are considering the preferences of the Senate delegation rather than simply the
candidates alone, the cutpoint that divides voters is located at -1.5; anybody to the right of -1.5 will vote for the
Republican Senate candidate, while anybody to the left of -1.5 will vote for the Democratic Senate candidate.
If our goal is to determine whether voters prefer the closer candidate (as proximity theory would suggest) or the
closer delegation (as balancing theory would suggest), however, we run into a problem: Most voters are going to
vote for the same candidate regardless of whether they are choosing the most proximate candidate or the most
proximate delegation.  A voter with preferences well to the left of center will vote Democratic, regardless of
whether they behave in line with balancing or proximity theory; similarly, a voter with preferences that are well to
the right of center will vote Republican no matter what.  The only voters who get different predictions under each of
the two theories are those who are located between the proximity cutpoint and the balancing cutpoint—in the
Figure 1 example, these are voters located between -1.5 and 0, the region which is bracketed by the purple
shading.  In our example, any voter between -1.5 and 0 will vote for the Democrat if they are choosing the closest
candidate but will vote for the Republican if they are choosing the closest Senate delegation.  Seeing how these
individuals—who we can think of as “cross-pressured” voters—behave will allow us to gauge how much support
there is for balancing, as opposed to proximity voting.
Thankfully, data from the Congressional Cooperative Election Studies (CCES), available for the 2006, 2008, 2010,
and 2012 U.S. election cycles, asks individuals all of the things we would need to know in order to determine how
they would vote under the proximity model as opposed to the balancing model.  To explain, CCES respondents
are asked to identify where they themselves stand on a left-right scale, where they perceive both of their state’s
major-party U.S. Senate candidates to stand on the same left-right scale, as well as where they perceive each of
their two U.S. Senators (thus including the Senator who is not up for re-election) to be located on the left-right
ideological continuum.  So for each voter, we have all of the information necessary for predicting how he or she
would vote under each theory.  This of course also means we can cleanly identify voters for whom proximity theory
and balancing theory produce different predictions.
Figure 2 looks at how voters with different predictions under proximity and balancing ultimately vote.  As we see,
regardless of the election year, the vast majority of voters, when pulled in different directions between the
candidate to whom they are closest and the candidate who forms the Senate delegation to which they are closest,
choose the candidate and not the delegation to which they are closest.
Figure 2 – Candidate votes predicted by proximity and balancing models
I also conduct multivariate analysis that looks at the vote choice of those who get different predictions under
balancing and proximity theory.  When I control for individual-level factors that are well-known to affect vote
choice, such as an individual’s race, party identification and income, along with election-level variables such as
incumbency and candidate quality, I find that even above and beyond these important factors, an individual’s
proximity to one candidate over another is a highly influential determinant of how he or she ultimately votes, while
the effect of an individual’s proximity to one Senate delegation over another is not statistically distinguishable from
zero.  In other words, the strong evidence in Figure 2 that the candidate to whom a voter is closest trumps the
Senate delegation to which the voter is closest is confirmed by my multivariate analysis, which I encourage
interested readers to examine in the full-text version of my article.
In sum, split-party Senate delegations present an interesting puzzle for students of American elections and
representation; my research rules out one explanation for such opposite-party Senate pairs: strategic, purposive
behavior on the part of voters.  If the phenomenon of states electing one Democratic Senator and one Republican
Senator largely arises from proximity voting, as my results suggest, then it is likely the case that in such states,
one or more of the following is occurring: the composition of state electorates are changing from one election cycle
to the next; state electorates are remaining relatively stable in their membership but the preferences of at least
some of the individuals comprising the electorate shift from one election cycle to the next; or the left-right stance of
Senate candidates fielded by the major parties changes from more extreme to less extreme from one cycle to the
next.
Thus, research that has identified challenger quality, heterogeneous electorates (here, here, here, and here) and
candidate-centered politics, among other factors, as strong explanations for why some states elect opposite-party
pairs of Senators, seems suggestively supported by my findings.  Future work should further unpack the multitude
of survey data available to scholars of elections to explore these explanations that might resolve the seeming
paradox that split-party Senate delegations are largely the result of proximity voting yet, by definition, entail one
party’s candidate winning one election and the other party’s candidate winning the next.            
This article is based on the paper, ‘Balancing act? Testing a theory of split-party U.S. Senate delegations’, in
Electoral Studies.
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